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Hidden in the Past 
How Labour Relations Policy and Law 
Perpetuate Women's Economic inequality 
ANNE FORREST 
Lespolitiques et les lois des relations de 
travail au Canada deidvantagent sys- 
tkmatiquement les travailleuses parce 
que le travail et les syndicats endossent 
un modle de travail male P et ((in- 
dustrialisk n. Les conskquences de cette 
approche sont d'abord, lepetit nombre 
de femmes syndiqukes dans les indus- 
tries ozi les femmes dominent, ensuite, 
une reprksentantion syndicale axie sur 
la sigrigation A s  sexes et sur les nkgo- 
ciations collectives, enfin, un salaire 
plus bas pour le travail traditionnel 
des travailleuses duns les milieux syn- 
diquks. 
"A woman's place is in her union" is 
the colloquial expression of the re- 
search finding that unions are good 
for women. Many studies have docu- 
mented this advantage: by compari- 
son with equivalently qualified 
women in the non-union sector, or- 
ganized women earn significantly 
higher wages, have better fringe ben- 
efits, and greater job security. 
However, this does not mean that 
union women are equal to union 
men; they are not. Collective bar- 
gaining has narrowed but not elimi- 
nated the gender gap in pay, which 
remains substantial. O n  average, 
union women earned $2.77 (13.4 
per cent) less per hour than equiva- 
lently qualified union men in 1997 
(Drolet 2001) plus an unquantified 
difference in fringe benefits (Currie 
and Chaykowski) .' 
The persistence of this gap is gen- 
erally attributed to women's unequal 
status in the labour movement. There 
is no doubt that unions co-operated 
with employers in the past to ensure 
male privilege and that the legacy of 
those discriminatory practices con- 
tinues to affect the economic pros- 
pects of union women today. But 
this limited analysis heaps too much 
weight on union shoulders. Ofgreater 
significance to women is the indus- 
trial relations system within which 
unions function. 
Canadian industrial relations 
policy and law, which date from 1944 
but remain little changed today, were 
shaped in response to a war-time 
crisis in traditional men's work; hence, 
the very structure as well as the appli- 
cation of the law embody this pur- 
pose. The particular features of this 
system-highly regulated right to 
organize, fragmented union repre- 
sentation, decentralized collective 
bargaining, and restricted right to 
strike-reflect the compromise be- 
tween organized labour and capital 
that simultaneously acknowledged 
and constrained the right of (male) 
workers to bargain collectively 
through unions of their choice. For 
men-at least for those employed in 
. . 
manual occupations in large primary 
and secondary sector firms, the result 
was an acceptable-if diminished, 
version of "free" collective bargain- 
ing. Not so for women, who were 
and continue to be systematically 
disadvantaged by a labour relations 
system that assumes a "male" and 
"industrial" model of both work and 
unionism (Forrest 1997). 
A gender analysis of labour rela- 
tions policy and law has been over- 
looked by most critics of labour- 
management relations.' Because the 
system is ungenerous to all workers 
its one-sidedness is usually framed 
as a class rather than a gender prob- 
lem. There is ample evidence that 
the right to organize was wrenched 
from an unwilling government and 
subsequently protected only to the 
extent necessary to minimize work 
stoppages. The result is policy and 
law that fix the balance of power in 
h o u r  of employers whose manage- 
rial prerogative is carefully protected 
in unionized workplaces. 
Yet, within this intentionally re- 
strictive framework men have fared 
better than women. The strongholds 
of traditional men's work-capital- 
intensive manufacturing, natural re- 
source extraction, construction, and 
transportation-are better organized 
than women-dominated manufac- 
turing and service industries. Union 
men also have privileged access to 
the better paying, more secure jobs 
in organized workplaces and earn 
more than equivalently qualified 
union women. All are logical out- 
comes of Canada's industrial rela- 
tions system. 
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Organizing Women-Dominated are more complex in industries where 
Industries 
Industrial relations law and policy 
have failed women, most particularly 
those employed in traditional wom- 
en's work in the private sector. In the 
women-dominated industries of 
banking, insurance, retail, and serv- 
ices union density falls below 15 per 
cent (Akyeampong), not because 
there is a limited history of collective 
bargaining and few established 
protocols. 
Labour board definitions of ap- 
propriate bargaining units developed 
for manufacturing and resource in- 
dustries do not always fit the service 
sector. The less certain dividing line 
between managerial and non-mana- 
gerial employees and the many forms 
Where labour relations policy and law 
institutionalize the gender division of labour 
they reify small differences among workers that 
benefit employers move than workers and 
men more than women. 
these employees do not wish to be 
represented by unions or because 
unions have ignored these industries, 
but because the law allows employers 
to avoid collective bargaining. Prob- 
lems with the law were evident as 
early as the 1950s, following the high- 
profile failures to organize Eaton's and 
the chartered banks, and remain un- 
corrected today. Over the last 20 years, 
worker-initiated organizing drives in 
retail (e.g., Sears, Walmart, Eaton's), 
the banks (e.g., CIBC, TD, Canada 
Trustco), and fast-food restaurant 
chains (e.g., MacDonald's, Wendy's) 
have failed to establish on-going col- 
lective bargaining relationships. 
The Canadian system of collective 
bargaining requires unions to be le- 
gally recognized as exclusive bargain- 
ing agents; yet, the certification pro- 
cedure imposes a myriad of rules that 
afford employers legitimate ways to 
delay and avoid collective bargain- 
ing. Among other things, labour 
boards are called upon to determine 
whether a union's proposed bargain- 
ing unit is appropriate for collective 
bargaining and which jobs should be 
excluded from the union because the 
employees exercise managerial func- 
tions, have access to confidential in- 
formation, or perform jobs that put 
them at arm's length from their co- 
workers. Inevitably, these questions 
of "non-standard work" (e.g., part- 
time, casual, and limited term con- 
tract) characteristic of service indus- 
tries are but two issues that often 
require labour relations boards to 
hear detailed evidence about who 
does what in the workplace and with 
what degree of authority. As a result, 
workers often wait months for the 
outcome of certification. Even if the 
issues are resolved in the union's fa- 
vour, these delays sap workers' sup- 
port for the union, especially in small 
bargaining units3 where managers and 
employees work side-by-side and la- 
bour turn-over is often rapid. In the 
worst cases, the long delays between 
application and certification allow 
employers time to undermine work- 
ers' confidence in the union's ability 
to protect their interests, as a number 
of studies have shown.4 
In all  jurisdiction^,^ the law re- 
quires an employer to bargain in good 
faith and make every reasonable ef- 
fort to conclude a collective agree- 
ment with a certified union. How- 
ever, the reality often falls short of the 
theory. An employer who wishes to 
evade its legal obligations may do so 
by simply refusing to come to terms 
with the union. A "no-concessions" 
bargaining strategy is often lawful 
andeffective, as the Eaton's case dem- 
onstrates. After months of negotia- 
tions, the company offered its newly 
organized workers nothing more than 
they already had: no increase in wages, 
no improvement in benefits, no job 
security, and contract language "so 
outmoded as to be more relevant in 
the 1940s" (Forrest 1989: 195). 
"Hard bargaining" of this sort was 
lawful, the Ontario Labour Relations 
Board ruled, because Eaton's was 
prepared to sign a collective agree- 
ment, ifonly on its own terms (Forrest 
1989). 
Labour boards draw the line at 
employer demands that lack "any 
semblance of business justification" 
(Forrest 1989: 198). But Eaton's and 
other large-scale employers of wom- 
en's labour have legitimate, even 
- 
pressing, business reasons for main- 
taining labour costs at the industry 
norm that in service industries is 
often little above the minimum re- 
quired by law. Thus, despite the com- 
pany's admission that it was unwill- 
ing to improve wages and benefits 
because to do so would only encour- 
age further union organizing, the 
Ontario board detected no "anti- 
union animus." So long as an em- 
ployer participates in the bargaining 
process-its negotiating committee 
meets the union regularly, provides 
the necessary information, and ex- 
changes proposals-and does not 
undercut the bargaining authority of 
the union by unilaterally changing 
the terms and conditions of employ- 
ment, bargaining directly with em- 
ployees, or engaging in other forms 
ofanti-union conduct, labour boards 
are unlikely to find a violation of the 
duty to bargain in good faith. George 
Adams describes the purpose of the 
law as bringing the parties to the 
table; there is an expectation but no 
requirement that they come to agree- 
ment (10191-4). Labour boards do 
not ask whether an employer's offer is 
fair and are careful to guard against 
union efforts to use the duty to redress 
an imbalance in bargaining power. 
Frustrated by their employer's in- 
transigence, the Eaton's workers 
struck. But there, again, the law failed 
them. On  the picket line, they con- 
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fronred the h11 economic power of 
an employer with "deep pockets." In 
general, the law permits employers to 
draw on the full extent of their mana- 
gerial prerogative and financial re- 
sources to resist union bargaining de- 
mands. Eaton's responded by assign- 
ing managers to perform bargaining 
unit jobs, hiring replacement work- 
ers, and removing pickets from mall 
entrances. It could also have shifted 
work to other locations, eliminated 
jobs, or even closed a store down. 
Workers, by contrast, can only stop 
working, a sanction that has little 
import in the service sector where 
struck firms offer the same services in 
many locations. It is almost impossi- 
ble for a small group of workers-in 
the Eaton's case, less than four per 
cent of its employees at only six of its 
110 stores (Forrest 1989: 202)-to 
inflict a meaningful economic pen- 
alty against a national/multi-national 
employer within the law. Union ac- 
tions to bridge the gap in bargaining 
power such as sympathy strikes by 
other unions, working to rule in sup- 
plier or client firms, picketing that 
blocks access to the struck location, 
and other workers' refusals to cross a 
picket line are almost always unlaw- 
ful and so expose unions to fines and 
individual workers to industrial dis- 
cipline.' In the service sector, striking 
workers are often forced to rely on 
public support, which is uneven and 
unreliable at best. 
Thus, despite the Eaton's strikers 
cause cbL2bre status in Toronto, posi- 
tive press coverage, and a six-month 
work stoppage, collective bargaining 
did not take root. Not long after the 
- 
strikers returned to work, their un- 
ions were decertified or lost their 
bargaining rights as a result of inac- 
tivity (Forrest 1989: 210). 
Policy changes designed to remedy 
this obvious structural imbalance of 
power in private-sector services have 
been short-lived or rendered ineffec- 
tive by timid application. Pro-worker 
legislation such as the ban on hiring 
replacement workers during strikes, 
implemented by the New Demo- 
cratic Party (NDP) in Ontario, was 
immediately overturned by the sub- 
sequent Conservative government in 
response to employers' threats to re- 
locate to more accommodating juris- 
dictions. Longer-lived but no more 
effective is the availability offinal and 
binding arbitration to end first agree- 
ment disputes. In place for 20 years 
in some jurisdictions, the imposition 
of first agreements is a remedy that is 
sparingly (except in Quebec) and 
en's work." Using data for the eco- 
nomy as awhole, Marie Drolet (2002) 
concluded that 46.8 per cent of the 
gender gap in hourly wages is ex- 
plained by women's over-representa- 
tion in lowwage industries and occu- 
pations, 38.8 per cent by gender dis- 
crimination,' and only 10.6 per 
centby differences in personal char- 
acteristics. There are no studies of the 
gender gap in wages for the union 
It is standard bargaining practice for employers 
and unions to negotiate seniority elauses that 
restrict workershobility withiin a bargaining unit, 
even when the result is to lock women out of 
higher paid, male-dominated job categories, 
conservatively applied. Newly certi- 
fied unions should not expect radical 
improvements from the arbitration 
process. In first agreement situations, 
arbitrators impose terms and condi- 
tions of employment similar to those 
- .  
in comparable workplaces (Labour 
Law CasebookGroup 4 13-20), which 
could mean not much at all in pre- 
dominantly non-union industries. In 
any event, the imposition of a first 
collective agreement through arbi- 
tration does not ensure a second, 
which unions, however small and 
isolated, must bargain on their own. 
No surprise, then, that first agree- 
ment arbitration has not led to or- 
ganizing breakthroughs in the serv- 
ice sector. 
Institutionalized Job Segregation 
by Gender 
Labour relations policy and law 
establish gender as a legitimate basis 
for union representation and collec- 
tive bargaining. The result is that job 
segregation by gender is as sharp in 
the union as in the non-union sector7 
and has the same negative conse- 
quences for union women. Study 
after study has demonstrated that 
women earn less than men primarily 
because they are women and tend to 
be employed in undervalued "wom- 
sector on its own; however, there is 
no reason to believe the results would 
be significantly different. 
Job segregation by gender and low 
pay for traditional women's work are 
facts of life in unionized workplaces, 
in part, because workers are divided 
by occupation during the certifica- 
tion process. Depending on the juris- 
diction, one or all of blue-collar/ 
manual, officelclerical, professional, 
sales, security, part-time, casual, con- 
tractually limited, self-employed, and 
home workers are routinely separated 
from each other. These distinctions 
are based more on employers' than 
employees' needs, Judy Fudge ar- 
gues. However, even when labour 
boards take workers' interests into 
account they often rely on out-dated 
and sexist assumptions about their 
community of interest. In many ju- 
risdictions, the social construction of 
women and "women's work  as es- 
sentially different from men and tra- 
ditional men's work is affirmed by 
the labour board construct of appro- 
priate bargaining unit. 
The Ontario board has been par- 
ticularly rigid in its approach, assum- 
ing, for example, that pink-collar and 
part-time workers have economic 
interests different from--even in con- 
flict with-full-time, blue-collar/ 
manual workers in the same estab- 
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lishment. Although it is now rethink- Labour relations policy and law she was paid the established rate for 
ing its approach to part-time (but not 
ofice and clerical) workers (Adams 
7143-6), the legacy of this policy le- 
gitimates the differendinferior terms 
and conditions of employment at- 
tached to this form of traditional 
women's work. In the union sector, 
part-time workers are almost always 
paid less for doing the same jobs as 
full-time employees in the same es- 
- .  
can perpetuate job segregation by 
gender and inferior terms and condi- 
tions of employment for traditional 
women's work within bargaining 
units, as well as between them. It is 
standard bargainingpractice, and not 
unlawful, for employers and unions 
to negotiate seniority clauses that re- 
strict workers' mobility within a bar- 
gaining unit, even when the result is 
her job-and had she filed a griev- 
ance alleging gender discrimination 
it could not have succeeded without 
her union's support. There was no 
violation of the union's duty of fair 
representation-her union took her 
concerns seriously and investigated 
the matter fully (Christian)-and no 
violation of the employer's duty to 
bargain in good faith. In theory, MS 
Iln absence af pay equity legislation, it is neither uncommon 
nor unlavvCuf for employers and unions to evaluate female- 
dominated jobs by different criteria than male-dominated jobs and 
so "reproduce, rationalize, and tegirt"iruratem bwer  pay for 
jabs histori~alily pePformed by women. 
tablishment in the union sector. Their 
"0ther"llesser status is also &rmed 
by their more limited rights for pro- 
motion or in the event of cutbacks. 
Where full- and part-time workers 
are both organized, the latter are com- 
monly prevented from moving into 
the full-time jobs for which they are 
qualified, even when their accumu- 
lated seniority is greater than their 
full-time competitors. 
Where labour relations policy and 
law institutionalize the gender divi- 
sion of labour they reify small differ- 
ences among workers that benefit 
employers more than workers and 
men more than women. Why differ- 
ences between "non-standard" and 
"regularn employees are more funda- 
mental than other potential conflicts 
of interests, for example, between 
skilled and unskilled or junior and 
senior workers, has never been ex- 
plained. In practice, community of 
interest is a political, not a "natural" 
construct. Knitting together the di- 
verse sectional interests related to 
occupation, department, seniority, 
skill level, racelethnicity, and gender 
is an essential aspect of union educa- 
tion that begins but does not end 
with an organizing drive. Unions that 
fail to take on this project leave their 
members vulnerable to employer 
whipsawing.' 
to lock women out of higher paid, 
male-dominated job categories. 
Moreover, in absence of pay equity 
legislation, it is neither uncommon 
nor unlawful for employers and un- 
ions to evaluate female-dominated 
jobs by different criteria than male- 
dominated jobs and so "reproduce, 
rationalize, and legitimate" lower pay 
for jobs historically performed by 
women (Steinberg 388-90). 
Consider the case of Beatrice 
Harmatiuk, who was employed as a 
- .  
housekeeper at Pasqua Hospital 
where she earned less than her co- 
workers employed as caretakers. Al- 
though similar in skill, responsibil- 
ity, and working conditions, the all- 
male caretaker job scored ahead of 
the all-female housekeeper job in the 
negotiated job evaluation scheme 
because of its marginally greater physi- 
cal demands. By contrast, the extra 
mental effort required of housekeep- 
erswho interactedwith patientswent 
unrecognized. MS Harmatiuklost two 
appeals to her employer and union 
before she won her point at the Sas- 
katchewan Human Rights Tribunal. 
MS Harmatiuk was forced to take 
her complaint to -the Tribunal be- 
cause, by the standards labour rela- 
tions policy and law, she had in- 
curred no wrong. There was no vio- 
lation of the collective agreement- 
Harmatiuk's and other housekeepers 
could have used Saskatchewan's la- 
bour relations legislation to hold their 
employer and union to account if 
they subsequently failed to correct 
the discriminatory elements of the 
job evaluation scheme; however, this 
would be a novel use of a law that was 
never intended to promote gender 
equality. 
Decentralized Wage Bargaining 
Inferior terms and conditions of 
employment for traditional women's 
work are all but ensured by the long- 
standing policy preference for decen- 
tralized wage determination. Origi- 
nally intended to control wage growth 
in unionized "men'swork," this policy 
preference now weighs more heavily 
on union women. The gender gap in 
wages is largest in countries where 
wage bargaining is fragmented and 
decentralized (Kidd and Shannon; 
Reiman), that is, where workers in 
female-dominated bargaining units 
generally bargain on their own or 
with other female-dominated groups. 
In Canada, women are more often 
located in the smallest and lowest 
paid bargaining units (Currie and 
Chaykowski) and establishments 
(Drolet 2002) where they are poorly 
positioned to close the !gender gap in 
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wages, even when their unions are 
solidly behind the demand. 
For workers in women-dominated 
bargaining units and establishments 
closing the gender gap in pay neces- 
sitates bargaining in alliance with 
workers in male-dominated bargain- 
- 
ing units and establishments; yet, 
labour relations law and policy make 
this all but impossible. Unlike other 
OECD countries, the majority of 
collective bargaining in Canada in- 
volves only one bargaining unit in 
one establishment. This high degree 
of fragmentation is the consequence 
of what H.  D. Woods and Sylvia 
Ostry called a "bias" (270) in labour 
law that originates in the certifica- 
tion process. Single-establishment 
certification is the norm in Ontario 
and within establishments separate 
bargaining units are generally cre- 
ated for blue-collar, white-lpink-col- 
lar, sales, craftlprofessional employ- 
ees, and others. Bargaining units are 
not so narrowly described in every 
jurisdiction, however. Both the 
Canada and British Columbia boards 
prefer employer-wide bargaining 
units where collective bargaining is 
well established (Adams 71 19-23). 
But whatever the practice, bargain- 
ing rights follow certification rights. 
In all jurisdictions, the law requires 
each unionlbargaining unit, no mat- 
ter how small, to negotiate its own 
- 
collective agreement. 
Though not unlawful in itself, it is 
a violation of the duty to bargain in 
good faith for a union to make its 
desire for broader-based bargaining a 
strike issue. Accordingly, it is impos- 
sible for company-, industry-, or even 
establishment-wide bargaining to 
emerge unless it would be in the 
interests of the employer. But fewer 
and fewer firms are willing to negoti- 
ate on this basis. Economic restruc- 
turing and globalization have height- 
ened competitive pressures among 
workers within and between firms. 
The consequence is that well-estab- 
lished, broader-based bargaining has 
broken down in many industries as 
more and more unions are pressured 
to settle for wages and working con- 
ditions that reflect the profitability of 
each establishment (Cha~kowski 
2001: 241). 
Many labour relations experts such 
as Paul Weiler defend the existing 
fragmented, gender-segregated sys- 
tem of union representation and col- 
lective bargainingas essential to work- 
ers' right to self-organize. In Weiler's 
view, efforts to promote women's 
economic equality that disrupt es- 
tablished collective bargaining prac- 
tices should be avoided. Addressing 
the federal Pay Equity Task Force, 
Weiler argued that any "equal pay or 
pay equity statute which allows com- 
parisons of the value ofwork regard- 
less of bargaining unit boundaries 
would wholly undermine the notion 
of free collective bargaining" (1 0). 
Elevating the structures that 
perpetutate male privilege to immu- 
table principles of labour law is in- 
compatible with women's right to 
equal pay for work of equal value, as 
the case of Canadian Union ofPublic 
Employees v. Canadian Airlines/Air 
Canada (1998) demonstrates. In this 
situation, flight attendants in a fe- 
male-dominated bargaining unit were 
denied access to their logical, and 
only, male comparators in the male- 
dominated ground crew and pilot 
unions on the grounds that each bar- 
gaining unit constituted its own, 
unique system of labour relations. 
- .  
This was the employer's position in 
bargaining, later affirmed by the Ca- 
nadian Human Rights Commission. 
Taking note of the differences in 
- 
negotiated terms and conditions of 
employment in the three collective 
agreements, the Commission ruled 
that each ofthe three bargaining units 
was a functionally separate establish- 
ment, notwithstanding the fact that 
all work out of the same locations. 
This result is a classic catch-22. 
First, labour relations law imposes 
gender-segregated patterns of union 
representation and decentralized wage 
bargaining, then, when differentlin- 
ferior terms and conditions of em- 
ployment are negotiated for female- 
dominated bargaining units, the re- 
sult is interpreted as differences in 
workers' bargaining preferences and 
priorities, not as evidence ofsystemic 
gender discrimination. 
This interpretation was rejected 
by the federal government's Pay Eq- 
uity Task Force. Members of the 
Task Force identified the fragmented 
and gender-segregated structure of 
union representation and collective 
bargaining as obstacles to gender 
equality (Canada 448,462), even as 
they acknowledged the important role 
unions have played in advancing the 
rights of women. Their recommen- 
dations include a new structure-the 
"pay equity unitn-that would span 
all of the operations of a single em- 
ployer and so ensure equal pay for 
work ofequalvalue for workers across 
all bargaining units (Canada 206). If 
implemented, this form of broader- 
based bargaining would blunt the 
"malelindustrial" bias in labour rela- 
tion law while protecting workers' 
- 
right to organize into gendet-segre- 
gated, occupation-based unions. 
Conclusion 
Union women have put the issue 
of gender equality on the bargaining 
agenda of a reluctant labour move- 
ment. Pushing and prodding their 
way forward, feminist activists have 
insisted that unions address systemic 
barriers to women's economic equal- 
ity such as sexual harassment, family 
responsibilities, and low pay for tra- 
ditional women's work. The results 
are impressive. Limited at first to 
collective agreements negotiated by 
the most progressive unions, the fruits 
of these initiatives are now wide- 
spread. Sexual harassment polices and 
procedures, paid maternitylparental 
leave with no loss of seniority, family 
leave with pay, and pay equity legis- 
lation now benefit all or, in the case 
ofpay equity legislation, hundreds of 
thousands of women (and men) in 
the non-union as well as in the union 
sector. 
These gains have been made against 
the grain of an industrial relations 
system that is "male" and "indus- 
trial" in structure and purpose. But 
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much of this is hidden in the past. 
Present-day collective bargaining 
policy and law, though rooted in the 
sexist norms and mores of the 1940s, 
appear to be nothing more than the 
workings of a system that sets the 
balance of power in favour of em- 
ployers. It takes a feminist analysis to 
reveal the subtle ways that these norms 
and practices discriminate against 
women workers in particular. More 
importantly, it takes feminist activ- 
ists to press for change. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the 
helpfl  criticisms of Rena Isenberg 
Anne Forrest is an associateprofessor in 
the Odette School of Business, Univer- 
sity ofWindsor whereshe teaches courses 
about labour-management relations 
and women and work. She is currently 
director of Women 2 Studies. 
'In 1997, non-union women earned 
an average of $4.19 (23.5 per cent) 
less per hour than equivalently quali- 
fied non-union men (Drolet 2001: 
28). 
'But see Fudge and Forrest (1997). 
3The average size of newly certified 
unions in private-sector services in 
Ontario between 198 1 and 1999 was 
28 employees (Yates ). 
4See Thomason and the references 
cited therein. Using certification data 
for Ontario during the 1980s, 
Thomason concluded: "An employer 
who insists on a hearing, commits an 
unfair labour practice, and extends 
the period between the application 
and final disposition of the certifica- 
tion by 100 days . . . can reduce the 
proportion of employees supporting 
the union by almost 15 per cent and 
the probability of certification by 
nearly 20 per cent" (223). 
5Labour relations falls within provin- 
cial jurisdiction. The consequence is 
a multiplicity of statutes that differ 
one from the other in small rather 
than large ways. 
6The consequences for participating 
in an unlawful strike vary by circum- 
stance but can include dismissal. 
'Using collective agreement data from 
Ontario for the years 1980-1990, 
Currie and Chaykwoski estimated 
that almost two-thirds of women 
workers in the union sector would 
have to change jobs in order to elimi- 
nate gender segregation. This is higher 
than the Duncan indexes estimated 
for the economy as a whole (Fortin 
and Huberman). 
'Most researchers accept that the 
portion of the gender gap in wages 
not accounted for by differences in 
worker or workplace differences 
should be labelled gender discrimi- 
nation. 
'Whipsawing occurs when an em- 
ployer seeks to impose the inferior 
terms and conditions ofemployment 
negotiated with one group of work- 
ers on better-paid workers. The tac- 
tic is most successfulwhen the better- 
paid group is fearful that it may lose 
jobs to the lower paid group. The 
tactic can be used in reverse by un- 
ions in a tight labour market. 
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